The purpose of what follows is to investigate the working of the 1999 Act of Parliament in relation to the electoral process put in place for the purpose of maintaining the representation of the hereditary element in the House of Lords. After nearly ten years it is good time to assess the consequences of this process, as this was one of the controversial measures in the 1999 Act. In the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 Sessions of Parliament Lord Avebury introduced House of Lords (Amendment) Bills to repeal this electoral process. Both Bills received second readings after the issues were debated. Also in the 2007-2008 Session Lord (David) Steel of Aikwood introduced the House of Lords Bill, which included a second Part which covered the same measure as Lord Avebury's Bill. This House of Lords Bill has also received a second reading and had one session in the Committee stage. So the working of this electoral process is likely to be a topic of debate in the current [2008] [2009] Session of the House of Lords. We suggest that there are three possible options to deal with the present and likely future issues for this electoral process. These we present as a contribution to a wider debate on the way forward for this constitutional issue.
An acceptable second chamber
The New Labour Government led by Tony Blair came to power in 1997 with a mandate to reform the House of Lords. As there was no firm idea of how the reformed House of Lords would be constituted the first stage was to create a 'transitional' chamber. There was a desire by some in the Government to exclude all hereditary peers from the Chamber but political considerations prevailed. As a result of a deal negotiated by the then Leader of the Conservative peers, Lord Cranborne, 92 peers were allowed to remain in the transitional chamber, and elections took place for the 90 elected places 1 . This resulted in a group of peers who reflected well the composition of the hereditary peerage, in terms of the origin and date of the titles held in 1999 2 . But the question was how to maintain this representation. Many Labour supporters would have been happy to see this representation eroded over the years by the natural process of death. However the hereditary peers managed to insert an electoral process into the 1999 Act, to ensure the number of hereditary peers remained at 92. Thus a mixed second chamber has persisted as proposed by the 1999 Act with the 90 elected hereditary peers representing the historic hereditary peerage and the remaining directly appointed Life Peers. Though such a solution to the composition of the second chamber has found favour, it was also pointed out at the time that there were problems with this arrangement 3 . Firstly there was no advance towards making the second chamber more democratic. Secondly it did not fulfil the Labour Party's manifesto commitment to remove the hereditary element entirely from the House of th November. This session terminated the membership of the unelected hereditary peers and peeresses. The 15 Elected Office Holders had been chosen the week before. This election process worked well in reflecting the composition of the hereditary peerage. How were these peers (and peeresses) to be replaced in the event of death? Obviously not by the natural inheritance process that had been traditionally used. In what reflected a belief that this transitional chamber would not last long, it was agreed that the 1999 election results would be used, if required before the next general election, which occurred in 2001. So the best two runners-up (Lord Cobbold and Lord Chorley) joined the Cross-benchers in 2000 and 2001. This method of replacement had the advantages of being both the simplest and also least controversial as these runners-up, who had missed election originally by a few votes, had the most right to represent the hereditary peerage. However it could not persist as the rights of new holders of peerages, as they succeeded to hereditary peerages, would be ignored. Also those who had stood in the original 1999 election would grow old and die. 
Is the electoral process acceptable to the interested parties?
In order to consider whether this process is acceptable, and therefore there is no great urgency to change the present arrangements, it is necessary to decide who has an interest in answering this question. The first group with an interest is the hereditary peerage. They may conclude that the House of Lords reform has reflected and enhanced the negotiating skill of their leaders in that they ensured the inclusion of this electoral process in the 1999 Act and the continued presence of the hereditary peerage in the House of Lords to maintain the integrity of the second chamber. The Labour Government in 1997 had a mandate to reform the House of Lords. So far the progress made in this reform has included the creation of the first stage of a 'transitional' chamber. This first stage did not exclude all hereditary peers from the Chamber although it did succeed in excluding the majority. This had the effect of ending the inbuilt Conservative advantage. The result has been a House of Lords with no party or group with an overall majority. In fact the Labour, Conservative and Cross-Bench groups have rough parity (of about 200 peers) 6 . The breaking of the Conservative majority in the House of Lords was probably one of the main stimulants to changing the composition of the House of Lords. As this has been achieved, the present Labour Government of Gordon Brown is likely to be satisfied to accept the present arrangement. 
Consequences of the electoral process
In outlining the working of the electoral process we have highlighted some of the consequences. Now we go into a little more detail about the effects of the working of the 1999 Act which might not have been foreseen. The first is connected with gender. The hereditary peerage was basically a male caste. Until 1958 there were no female members of the House of Lords, hence the reason for its name. Even prior to that however there were some female members of the hereditary peerage, but they were barred from entering the House of Lords. It accounted for 11% of the hereditary peerage in 1999 and managed to be elected to 13 (14%) of the 90 places available. So it was slightly more favourably represented than would have been expected. In the last ten years one Scottish peer has died and three of the nine peers elected have been Scottish peers, a net gain of two. The Scottish peerage now has 15 (17%) of the 90 places available. Though this is hardly a major constitutional issue, it is interesting. So amongst some Scots there seems to be a stronger desire to participate in the political institutions of the United Kingdom than one would be led to believe if you listened to the views on the Union propagated by their First Minister Alex Salmond. A third consequence of the electoral process is that new peers, who have succeeded to their hereditary peerages since 1999 could be elected. At first when it was thought that this transitional chamber would not last long, it was agreed that the runners-up in the 1999 election results would be used. The measure was employed to compensate those who had just failed to be elected in 1999. This continued to be the situation with near failures in the 1999 election being elected in the subsequent by-elections. What could be the options? We suggest that there are three. A first option is to stay with the present electoral process which involves using by-elections. The advantages of this option are firstly that no legislative action has to be taken and secondly that the present composition of the hereditary peerage is maintained. The disadvantages are firstly the consequences which we have outlined -lack of gender balance, Scottish representation and the recruitment of new, younger members and secondly the increase in the number of by-elections. Though the Political Party choices involve small electorates (and hence are easily managed) the Elected Office Holders byelections involve all the members of the House of Lords and these would be likely to occur once every two years. A second option is to widen the electorate of the present electoral process for byelections to the whole House of Lords, which was suggested by Lord Desai during the debate on the second reading of Lord Avebury's Bill. The advantages of this option are firstly that candidates for by-elections for the Political Party choices would have to appeal to a wider constituency and secondly that this could be done by a simple amendment of the 1999 Act which would make the process more transparent and perhaps more acceptable to all parties in the House of Lords. The disadvantages are firstly that by-elections involving all the members of the House of Lords would be likely to occur three times a year and secondly that the Conservatives might feel that they would be the losers in such an arrangement. However when Elected Office Holders candidates were chosen by the whole House, in the two by-elections held so far (in 2003 and 2005) , in both cases Conservatives were elected. As stated above, as the Conservatives do not have a majority in the House of Lords, this would suggest that the replacements were chosen not simply for Party reasons but on merit. A third option is to go back to the original 1999 electoral process and have elections every Parliament and fill the vacancies that occur with runners-up as was done before the 2001 general election. The advantages of this option are firstly ease of administration, as elections would only occur normally every four or five years, so
